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Abstract
Reciprocating exchange with other humans requires individuals to infer the intentions of their partners. Despite the
importance of this ability in healthy cognition and its impact in disease, the dimensions employed and computations
involved in such inferences are not clear. We used a computational theory-of-mind model to classify styles of interaction in
195 pairs of subjects playing a multi-round economic exchange game. This classification produces an estimate of a subject’s
depth-of-thought in the game (low, medium, high), a parameter that governs the richness of the models they build of their
partner. Subjects in each category showed distinct neural correlates of learning signals associated with different depths-of-
thought. The model also detected differences in depth-of-thought between two groups of healthy subjects: one playing
patients with psychiatric disease and the other playing healthy controls. The neural response categories identified by this
computational characterization of theory-of-mind may yield objective biomarkers useful in the identification and
characterization of pathologies that perturb the capacity to model and interact with other humans.
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Introduction
Many of the inferences that we make about others, or about
their models of us, are silent and subtle [1,2]. One route for
understanding the neural basis of such inferences comes from
building computational models of social exchange that quantify
their nature and evolution over the course of interactions.
Recent behavioral and neuroimaging work in this area has
employed interactive economic games that required subjects to
model their partners’ strategies [3–6]. This work focused on
relatively small cohorts of subjects, or on subjects knowingly
playing a computer partner. Therefore, questions about individ-
ual differences in styles of play, and whether or not the partner
was treated by the brain like a human partner remain largely
open (but see 6).
Figure 1 outlines the strategy of the approach. We used a multi-
round reciprocation game (the multi-round trust game, Figure 1A),
classifying the play of a large (n = 195) number of pairs of players
(dyads) [7–9] via a computational realization of the models of each
other that they build [10]. This classification used the observed
patterns of monetary exchange to infer two parameters important
for all such exchanges: (1) the sensitivity of a subject to deviations
from fair splits of money across the two players (called inequality
aversion) [11]; and (2) the subject’s depth-of-thought or cognitive
level in the game, that is, the depth to which they modeled their
interaction with their partner [12]. After classification along these
two dimensions, we sought neural correlates of learning signals
(interpersonal error signals) inferred by the model that are
important for playing the game successfully (Figure 1B and 1C).
We describe the model below.
A player’s type is represented by her degree of inequality
aversion. Players value immediate payoffs, but to a lesser degree if
the split of money between them is inequitable [13]:
Ui(xi,xj ; ai,bi)~xi{ai max(xj{xi,0){bi max(xi{xj ,0) ð1aÞ
where xi is the money obtained by player i and xj is the amount
obtained by player j. Two sorts of inequity are potentially
important: envy (partner j gets more than subject i ; ai in eqn 1a)
and guilt (subject i gets more than partner j; bi in eqn 1a). The
envy and guilt parameters comprise what we consider as the type
of a player. Empirically, the majority of investors invest more than
half of the endowment and the modal behavior of trustees is to
split the sum of money evenly. Hence, the influence of ‘‘envy’’ on
subjects’ choices was minimal. For simplicity, we assume ai~0
and consider only ‘‘guilt’’ - the aversion to inequity favorable to
the subject – as the way to type a player. Therefore, player i’s type
is fully described by bi[½0,1, the ‘‘guilt’’ parameter. The utility
function becomes:
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Ui(xi,xj ; ai,bi)~xi{bi max(xi{xj ,0) ð1bÞ
The second important feature of the model is depth-of-thought
in the game [12], which derives from the estimates that each
player maintains about the type of their partner. To maximize
long-run utility, a player must estimate this type, and update the
estimate when observing their partner’s actions. Of course, I may
estimate your type, your estimate of my type, your estimate of my
estimate of your type, and so forth [14]. Thus we define deeper
thinkers in the game as those who use more sophisticated
simulations of play of this sort to update these estimates.
A range of behavioral data suggests one strong constraint on
how subjects model their partners, that is, they assume that their
partners play one level less sophisticated than themselves [15]. We
assume that all players plan ahead and choose actions that have
beneficial consequences, but differ in how they interpret the signals
from their partners to update their beliefs, and how they expect
their partners perceive them through their actions. To estimate
one’s partner’s type, a level 0 subject does not simulate his
partner’s play, but assumes his partner is level 0 i.e. also has a
naı¨ve model of them. A level 1 subject assumes his partner is a
level 0 player and simulates how a level 0 partner makes choices. A
level 2 subject assumes his partner is level 1 and simulates how a
level 1 player interacts throughout the game. This kind of
recursion lies at the heart of mentalizing (simulating) other
autonomous agents who concurrently generate models of us – it
also lies at the heart of many models of predator-prey interactions
[16].
The computational model of behavior – simulating
interactions with one’s partner
Here we write the model for how player i forms an estimate of
optimal play at each round t by calculating the values Qti of their
possible actions ati . The actions are the amounts to invest or to
return. The Q values are the expected summed utilities over the
next two rounds (as a simplification, players are assumed to look at
the current round and the round after). The utility for player i
depends on the actions of player j, which in turn depends on the
type of player j, and the reasoning that player j does about player i.
Player i does not know player j’s type, but can learn about it from
the history of their interactions, which, up to round t, is
Dt~f(a1i ,a1j ),    ,(at{1i ,at{1j )g. Formally, player i maintains
beliefs Bti , in the form of a probability distribution over the type
of player j, and computes expected utilities by averaging over these
beliefs. Bayes theorem is used to update the beliefs based on
evidence.
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where, for convenience, we write Ui(a
t
i ,a; bi) as a function of the
possible actions a of player j rather than the money this player
earns. The second term in equation (2) concerns the value of future
2 rounds in the exchange (except in the last round, where this term





round t+1, where the new beliefs Btz1i take account of the action
ati being considered by player i, and all the possible actions a
t
j of
player j. Equation (2) is a form of Bellman evaluation equation.
The players can calculate the Q values, including updating the
beliefs, by simulating the course of play with their partners. This
simulation is a central feature of the model with players adopting
higher levels of depth-of-thought requiring more simulation (see
belief updates in Supporting Information).
Results
Classification of interpersonal interaction
The model described above constitutes a full generative account
of a subject playing the multi-round trust game, and incorporates
several key cognitive mechanisms engaged by such a staged
interpersonal interaction. Player i is characterized by their private
type bi, their depth-of-thought level ki, and the prior beliefs B
0
i .
Player j is characterized in just the same way. We estimated the
parameters of both players in each dyad by maximizing the log
likelihood of their choices over the 10 rounds of the game. The
averaged maximal log likelihood of all 195 investors was
211.9260.27. In our model, we assume that players take one of
five possible actions. If all the five possible actions were chosen




)~{16:1. Our computational theory-of-mind model
fitted the behavior significantly better than assuming that players
act randomly (one-sample test, P = 1.51610235). For the purposes
of comparison, we also built a reinforcement learning (RL) model
incorporating inequality aversion (details in Supporting Informa-
tion). We found that the RL model performed poorly; when we
optimized the learning rate in the model, the optimum was
Author Summary
Human social interactions are extraordinarily rich and
complex. The ability to infer the intentions of others is
essential for successful social interactions. Although most
of our inferences about others are silent and subtle, traces
of their effects can be found in the behavior we exhibit in
various tasks, notably repeated economic exchange
games. In this study, we use a computational model that
uses an explicit form of other-modeling to classify styles of
play in a large cohort of subjects engaging in such a game.
We classify players according to their depth of recursive
reasoning (depth-of-thought), finding three groups whose
performance throughout the task differed according to
several measures. Neuroimaging results based on the
model classification show a differential neural response to
depth-of-thought. The model also detected differences in
depth-of-thought between two groups of healthy sub-
jects: one playing patients with psychiatric disease and the
other playing healthy controls. These results demonstrate
the power of a quantitative approach to examining
behavioral heterogeneity during social exchange, and
may provide useful biomarkers to characterize mental
disorders when the capacity to make inferences about
others is impaired.
Computational Phenotyping of Social Interactions
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 2 December 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e1002841
degenerate in the sense that no learning occurred, and all actions
were selected with equal probability (random choices).
Figure 2A shows the frequency histogram of depth-of-thought
classification achieved by inverting the generative model described
above. About half of all the 195 investors are classified as strategic
level 0. The remaining investors are almost equally divided into
level 1 and level 2 players. There are significant dynamic behavioral
features that correlate with the depth-of-thought levels that we
estimate using our model. The style of play across rounds of the
game is different and correlates well with the intuition that players
with higher depths-of-thought are sensitive to richer features of the
game than those possessing lower levels. In Figure 2B, of all 195
investors, levels 1 and 2 start the game with high offers and maintain
throughout the game, except that the highest depth-of-thought
players decrease their offers towards the end of the game (which is
strategic). Moreover, level 0 investors open low and stay low
throughout the game, a strategy that tends to break cooperation
with the trustee. Lastly, level 1 and 2 players make significantly
more money overall than level 0 players (Figure 2C).
Neural representations
According to the generative model, players make predictions
about the likely course of events through the game. These
predictions lead naturally to prediction errors, which can be used
Figure 1. Classification of investors. A) One player (‘‘investor’’) is endowed with $20 at the beginning of each round. The investor chooses any
fraction I of the $20 to send to the other player (‘‘trustee’’). The investment is tripled to 3I en-route to the trustee. The trustee chooses a fraction R of
the tripled amount (3I) to repay. Subjects play the same partner for ten consecutive rounds. B) Using the observed exchanges between the players,
investors are classified according to their estimated inequality aversion and their depth-of-thought (strategic level) in the game (see main text for a
description of the generative model). All 195 pairs included in this classification; this included 55 pairs where the trustee was diagnosed with
Borderline Personality Disorder. C) First and second order interpersonal prediction errors are sought in the investors’ brain responses separately for
each depth-of-though category. The 1st order interpersonal prediction error is taken as the difference between actual repayment ratio R and
expected amount due to the investor’s model of the trustee’s repayment. The 2nd order prediction error is taken as the difference between the
investment ratio I and the investor’s model of the trustee’s model of what the investor will send; hence, the term second order error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002841.g001
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to generate control signals to guide choices. In games against
nature, prediction errors associated with rewarding outcomes have
frequently been observed in the BOLD signal measured in striatal
regions [17–19]. Games against other players offer much richer
possibilities for neural responses since players have a range of
interpersonal signals that they can model (e.g. Figure 1C). We here
focus on the investor side of the interaction because this role has
proved to be particularly sensitive for classifying styles of play in
prior work [20].
Two types of interpersonal prediction errors emerge naturally in
the reciprocating interactions of the multi-round trust game. The
first order prediction error in the investor is a comparison between
the investor’s current model of what the trustee will return and the
amount actually returned. This error is computed at the time that
the repayment from the trustee is revealed to the investor. This
error requires information sent back from the trustee.
By contrast, the second order prediction error in the investor
requires a comparison between the investor’s offer and the investor’s
internal model of what the trustee expects from the investor, that is,
information that is exclusively internal to the investor. This
information is available to the investor before any immediate feedback
from the trustee, and is potentially available during the entire epoch,
starting from the time of the cue and up until the time when the actual
investment is made. In this paper, we choose the time the investor
submits as a natural trigger for this signal, but with the understanding
that it might have been computed and thus available earlier.
Thus, the first order error can be evaluated at the time the
repayment from the trustee is revealed. In a similar spirit, the second
order error is defined at the time the investor’s offer is submitted
since it is at this time that the investor brain can compare their
actual offer to their (internal) model of what the trustee expects.
Our hypothesis for the first order inter-personal prediction error
was that players classified as level 0 would display a large response
to this error, while the higher levels would not, since this signal is
not a critical component of the high level players’ planning.
We divided the first order interpersonal prediction error of all
195 healthy investors classified within a certain cognitive level into
quintiles, performed separate GLM analysis at individual rounds,
and then generated contrasts between rounds with high 1st order
prediction errors (.60%) and rounds with low 1st order prediction
errors (#40%) on the beta images of the events of interest. The
contrast analysis at the revelation of the trustee’s repayment
showed that level 0 investors (n = 102) had robust activations in
bilateral striatal regions (Figure 3A, whole-brain FDR corrected at
P,0.05; peak MNI coordinates: right caudate (8, 12, 0), t = 4.49,
57 voxels; left caudate (212, 12, 4), t = 3.74, 73 voxels; right
putamen (24, 4, 0),t = 4.02, 88 voxels; left putamen (224, 4, 4),
t = 4.10, 72 voxels). These striatal activations were not observed in
investors with level 1 (n = 49) or level 2 (n = 44) depth-of-thought.
We also performed a direct comparison among investors with
different depth-of-thought levels on the 1st order interpersonal
prediction errors using ANOVA. The group contrast results
Figure 2. Investor depth-of-thought classification separates distinct behavioral trajectories through the game. A) The distribution of
depth-of-thought levels in all 195 investors. About half of the investors are classified as having depth-of-thought level 0. The remaining half is almost
equally divided into having depth-of-thought level 1 and 2. B) Investment ratios by rounds from all three levels of depth-of-thought investors, level 0
(n = 102), level 1 (n = 49), level 2 (n = 44). C) Total monetary points earned at the end of the game in all three levels of investors. Both level 1 and level
2 investors made significantly more points than level 0 investors (Tukey HSD test, P,1026 and P,1025, respectively). No significant difference in total
earnings was found between level 1 and level 2 investors (P.0.1). Error bars represent standard errors (SE).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002841.g002
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showed that the level 0 investors had higher caudate activation
than level 1 investors (Figure 3B left, P,0.001, uncorrected; peak
MNI coordinates: (4, 16, 0), t = 4.04, FWE corrected at P,0.05
with small volume correction applying the anatomical mask of
bilateral caudate). We also found that level 2 investors had higher
right temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) activation than level 0
investors associated with the 1st order interpersonal prediction
errors (Figure 3B right, whole-brain FDR corrected at P,0.05;
peak MNI coordinates: (52, 248, 28), t = 4.70, 7 voxels).
Our hypothesis for the second order inter-personal prediction
error was that players classified as level 0 would display no
response to this higher order interpersonal error (since their model
of the other’s model of themselves is impoverished), whereas
players classified as higher level would.
We divided the second order inter-personal prediction error of
all 195 healthy investors classified within a certain cognitive level
into quintiles, performed separate GLM analysis at individual
rounds, and then generated contrasts between rounds with high
2nd order prediction errors (.60%) and rounds with low 2nd order
prediction errors (#40%) on the beta images of the events of
interest. The contrast at the submission of the investor’s decisions
revealed that level 2 investors had significant activations in
bilateral putamen (Figure 3C, whole-brain FDR corrected at
P,0.05; peak MNI coordinates: right putamen (24, 8, 24),
t = 3.79, 23 voxels; left putamen (220, 8, 24), t = 3.11, 7 voxels).
We did not observe any striatal activations in level 0 and level 1
investors for the 2nd order prediction errors. We also performed an
ANOVA analysis on the three depth-of-thought levels of investors.
The group contrast analysis found that level 2 investors had higher
ventral striatal activation than level 0 investors when computing
the 2nd order interpersonal prediction errors (Figure 3D, P,0.005
uncorrected; peak MNI coordinates (12, 8, 212), t = 3.41, FWE
corrected at P,0.05 with small volume correction applying the
anatomical mask of bilateral caudate).
It is possible that when grouping the rounds according to the
high or low quintiles of prediction errors, some subjects might be
exclusively included in the high group, or in the low group. This
raised the concern that the contrast results above might be biased
by those distinct subjects. We therefore counted the number of
subjects only present in the high group, or in the low group for the
1st and 2nd interpersonal prediction errors, respectively. We
showed that the vast majority of subjects made contributions to all
quintiles of prediction errors, with only an extremely small number
of subjects contributing to just the high or low quintiles (Table S1).
We also plotted the magnitudes of the interpersonal prediction
errors divided into high or low quintiles across the depth-of-thought
Figure 3. Inter-personal prediction errors: differential neural response as a function of investor depth-of-thought. A) Contrast analysis
between rounds with high (.60%) and low (#40%) 1st order interpersonal prediction errors when repayments were revealed. Level 0 investors
(n = 102) had robust activations in bilateral striatal regions (whole-brain FDR corrected at P,0.05; peak MNI coordinates: caudate (8, 12, 0), t = 4.49;
putamen (24, 4, 0),t = 4.02). These striatal activations were not observed in investors with level 1 (n = 49) or level 2 (n = 44) depth-of-thought. B) Group
contrast analysis on the 1st order interpersonal prediction errors. Left, level 0 investors had higher caudate activation than level 1 investors (P,0.001,
uncorrected; peak MNI coordinates: (4, 16, 0), t = 4.04, FWE corrected at P,0.05 with small volume correction applying the anatomical mask of
bilateral caudate). Right, level 2 investors had higher right temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) activation than level 0 investors associated with the 1st
order interpersonal prediction errors (whole-brain FDR corrected at P,0.05; peak MNI coordinates: (52, 248, 28), t = 4.70, 7 voxels). C) Contrast
analysis between rounds with high (.60%) and low (#40%) 2nd order interpersonal prediction errors when investments were submitted. Level 2
investors had significant activations in bilateral putamen (whole-brain FDR corrected at P,0.05; peak MNI coordinates: putamen (24, 8, 24), t = 3.79).
We did not observe any striatal activations in level 0 and level 1 investors for the 2nd order prediction errors. D) Group contrast analysis on the 2nd
order interpersonal prediction errors. Level 2 investors had higher ventral striatal activation than level 0 investors when computing the 2nd order
interpersonal prediction errors (P,0.005 uncorrected; peak MNI coordinates (12, 8, 212), t = 3.41, FWE corrected at P,0.05 with small volume
correction applying the anatomical mask of bilateral caudate). Color bars display t scores.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002841.g003
Computational Phenotyping of Social Interactions
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 5 December 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e1002841
levels. We did this to rule out the possibility that a few subjects were
dominating the observed results. The differences between the high
and low quintiles were comparable across all the three levels of
investors for both the 1st and 2nd order interpersonal prediction
errors (Figure 4). Thus, the differential neural activations to the
prediction errors observed here cannot be attributed to the
differences in the magnitudes of prediction errors per se.
Biosensor manipulation: Trustee ‘types’ induce depth-of-
thought distributions in healthy investors
Earlier work [9] found that trustees diagnosed with Borderline
Personality Disorder (BPD) played uncooperatively to an extent that
they could not maintain the cooperation of their partner investor. In
that work, the impact of the trustee behavior was ‘read out’ through
the willingness of the investor to sustain high offer levels throughout
the rounds of the game. Figure 5 shows two distributions of estimated
investor depth-of-thought levels as a function of distinct trustee types.
Panel A shows the distribution when healthy investors play
anonymous healthy trustees (n = 48 pairs). In this exchange,
healthy subjects never meet their partner before the game and do
not see or meet them after the game. They arrive at the lab and
are randomly assigned roles in separate rooms. Panel B shows the
distribution when healthy investors play subjects diagnosed with
borderline personality disorder. There is a more dramatic shift
toward lower depth-of-thought levels despite the fact that these
subjects play the healthy investor anonymously. The distributions
in panels A and B are statistically different (see legend Figure 5).
We also recruited 38 trustee matched for lower socio-economic
scale (SES) as a SES match for the Borderline personality disorder
trustees. These trustees also played anonymously and induced a
similar lower depth-of-mind distribution in the investors (Figure
S2) suggesting that lower SES may be one source of influence for
the incapacity of the Borderline subjects to sustain cooperation
with their investor partners.
Discussion
In this paper, we used a Bayesian computational model that
involves an explicit representation of theory of mind to classify a
large number of subjects playing an economic exchange game. We
Figure 4. Magnitude of interpersonal prediction errors as a function of estimated depth-of-thought for investors. Average 1st order
A) and 2nd order B) inter-personal prediction errors: low (bottom two quintiles), high (top two quintiles). The differences between the high and low
1st order interpersonal prediction errors were as follows: level 0 investors (mean= 10.05, SE = 0.38), level 1 investors (mean= 15.97, SE = 0.55), level 2
investors (mean= 14.30, SE = 0.58). The differences between the high and low 2nd order interpersonal prediction errors were: level 0 investors
(mean= 9.76, SE = 0.22), level 1 investors (mean= 10.62, SE = 0.31), level 2 investors (mean= 11.72, SE = 0.33).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002841.g004
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used the model to assess their level of depth-of-thought. Our
classification produces three levels of players whose behaviour
correlates with important measures of performance through the
task. Neuroimaging results based on the model classification
showed a differential response to depth-of-thought. Additionally
we found a significant difference for investor depth-of-thought
distributions when comparing play with healthy trustees to play
with subjects diagnosed with borderline personality disorder
(BPD), a disorder known to disrupt inter-personal interactions.
BPD subjects are characterized by their unstable relationships, and
when they have played this game, they have tended to break
cooperation. Indeed, it has been shown that, for this group, the
anterior insula failed to sense the opponent’s low offers [8].
The striatum has long been shown to encode reward prediction
error signals in both passive and instrumental conditioning tasks
[17,21–23]. Recently striatal activation has also been observed in
social learning tasks [24] and tasks requiring mentalizing a
partner’s intention [3]. Here we found that striatum activity
correlated with two types of interpersonal prediction errors
evoked in a repeated social exchange game, and that these signals
were modulated by players’ depth-of-thought levels. Level 0
players, but not level 2 players, had robust activations in the
striatum to high 1st order interpersonal prediction errors
suggesting the naı¨ve players were particularly sensitive to
opponent’s actions and mainly used this type of errors to adjust
their own action policy. However, the striatum in level 2 players
responded only to the 2nd order interpersonal errors suggesting
that these relatively sophisticated players discounted the direct
influence of opponent’s actions and rather put more emphasis on
simulating and manipulating opponent’s beliefs and actions.
Other imaging experiments requiring subjects to model others’
intentions have also reported activations in frontoparietal regions
[3,5,24]. It is not clear why frontoparietal regions were not
observed in our paradigm. However, there is a clear path from
known error signaling in the striatum to our observations here of
2nd order inter-personal prediction errors, since a 2nd order
prediction error can be seen as a direct proxy for future returns to
the investor. In this reciprocation game, we have previously
reported that deviations from neutral reciprocity or tit-for-tat
behavior cause players to change their behavior [7,9]. Therefore,
an investment that deviates positively from what the trustee
expects (based on their model of the investor) should generate a
positive error signal in the trustee’s brain, which would itself lead
to the investor expecting an increased return. Under this
interpretation, the signal is exactly analogous to the range of
prediction error signals that show up encoded in BOLD
responses in the striatum. These neural results are congruent
with our behavioral observations. The most sophisticated level 2
investors invested high at the beginning to cultivate trust and
promote cooperation with their partners. But towards the end of
the exchange, they responded to the horizon of the game and
risked less money, reflecting their manipulative maneuver in the
beginning. Furthermore, we found that the sophisticated level 2
investors had higher activations in the right TPJ in response to
the 1st and 2nd order interpersonal prediction errors than the
naı¨ve level 0 investors. Right TPJ has been demonstrated to play
a critical role in belief reasoning tasks involving ‘‘theory of mind’’
[25,26]. Right TPJ has also been found to be specifically
modulated in people with higher strategic levels [27]. Further-
more the coordinates of the peak voxel of this activation place it
in a recently designated posterior region of the TPJ (TPJp) that is
well-connected to ‘‘areas identified with social cognition’’ [28].
The TPJ activation and its specific location within TPJ is
consistent with the idea that level 2 investors build more
sophisticated models of their opponents.
Figure 5. Distribution of depth-of-thought in investors as a function of trustee group. A) Anonymous trustees (n = 48) remain anonymous
to their investor partner for the entire game (and visa versa). B) Borderline personality disorder trustees were identified through an extensive set of
formal interview procedures (see King-Casas et al., 2008). On Fisher’s exact test, the borderline personality disorder-induced investor depth-of-though
distribution was significantly different from investors playing anonymous trustees (panel A; p = 1.6861026).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002841.g005
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Computational accounts developed in the framework of Markov
Decision Processes (MDP), and in particular reinforcement
learning models [29], have been successful in representing
behavior and illuminating neural substrates in situations where
agents interact with nature, and in which the environmental states
are fully observable. Such models have furthered our understand-
ing of the role of dopamine and related neural structures in reward
learning and decision-making [30,31]. However, those models are
limited in the typical social situations where agents interact and
effectively create an ever-changing, adapting landscape, which are
plausibly a raison d’etre for sophisticated cognition. Recently, some
progress has been made in establishing model-based approaches to
social interaction [3,4,32,33]. Our approach makes a commitment
to an explicit, generative model of higher-order thinking about
other social actors, some aspects of which are in common with the
recent work by Yoshida et al. (who also use their models to
compare autistic and healthy subjects) [4–6]. The space of such
models is vast, and explicit choices must be made at many steps
[4,10]. Nonetheless, our model is able to capture striking
heterogeneity in the behavior which we are then able to connect
to differences in neural activity. Further developments of this
approach also incorporating genetic data promise to help uncover
the genetic underpinnings of social heterogeneity.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
Informed consent was obtained for all research involving
human participants, and all clinical investigation was conducted
according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of
Helsinki. All procedures were approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the Baylor College of Medicine.
Subject characteristics
Data from four groups, total 195 pairs of subjects (18–64 yrs)
who played the trust game previously [5–8] were examined,
including an Impersonal group (48 pairs), a Personal group (54
pairs), a BPD group (55 pairs), and a BPD control group (38 pairs).
Subject pairs from the Impersonal, BPD, and BPD control groups
never met each other throughout the experiment. Subject pairs in
the Personal group were introduced to each other before playing
the task. Trustees in the BPD group were diagnosed with
borderline personality disorder (BPD), and were matched to
trustees in the BPD control group on socioeconomic status (SES).
In addition, investors in the BPD and BPD control groups were
recruited with socioeconomic status matched to trustees. Investors
in the Impersonal groups were students from Caltech and Baylor
College of Medicine.
Image acquisition and preprocessing
All scans were carried out on 3.0 Tesla Siemens Allegra
scanners. High-resolution T1-weighted scans
(1.0 mm61.0 mm61.0 mm) were acquired using an MP-RAGE
sequence (Siemens). Subjects then played the iterated trust game
for 10 rounds while undergoing whole-brain functional imaging.
The detailed settings for the functional run were as follows: echo-
planar imaging, gradient recalled echo; repetition time
(TR) = 2000 ms; echo time (TE) = 40 ms; flip angle = 90u; 64664
matrix, 26 4-mm axial slices angled parallel to the anteroposterior
commissural line, yielding functional 3.3 mm63.3 mm64.0 mm
voxels.
Images were analyzed using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm/software/spm2/). Slice timing correction was first applied
to temporally align all the images. Motion correction to the first
functional image was performed using a 6-parameter rigid-body
transformation. The average of the motion-corrected images was
co-registered to each subject’s structural images using a 12-
parameter affine transformation. Images were subsequently
spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) template by applying a 12-parameter affine transformation,
followed by nonlinear warping using standard basis functions.
Finally, images were smoothed with an 8 mm isotropic Gaussian
kernel and then high-pass filtered (128 s width) in the temporal
domain.
General Linear Model (GLM) analysis
Separate general linear models were specified for individual
rounds of each subject (6). All visual stimuli, motor responses and
motion parameters were entered as separate regressors that were
constructed by convolving each event onset with a canonical
hemodynamic response function in SPM2. Beta maps were
estimated for regressors of interest. The SPM images shown in
Figure 3 was generated as follows: both the first order and second
order interpersonal prediction errors of subjects classified with the
same depth-of-thought were divided into quintiles. For the 1st
order interpersonal prediction errors, beta images associated with
the event when the repayments were revealed were sorted
according to the prediction error quintiles. Contrast analysis
between the beta images from top two quintiles (.60%) and
images from the bottom two quintiles (#40%) were performed.
Similarly, contrasts for the 2nd interpersonal prediction errors were
generated from beta images associated with the event when the
investments were submitted.
Computational theory-of-mind model
See Text S1 for detailed descriptions. We also include a
reinforcement learning model in Text S1 for comparison.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Depth-of-thought distribution for investors
playing trustee with lower SES. Trustee group was matched
to the SES of the identified BPD trustees, which tended to be
lower than the average healthy trustee. In reciprocation games
(including the multi-round trust game), it is known that lower SES
correlates with lower offers and increased difficulty of sustaining
cooperation. This investor depth-of-thought distribution suggests
that reduced SES that can attend BPD may be one of the causative
factors in their style of play; however, these data are simply
consistent with that hypothesis and do not show causality. The
lower SES trustees induce a depth-of-thought distribution that is
significantly different from investors playing anonymous healthy
trustees using Fisher’s exact test (p = 1.9961028).
(TIF)
Figure S2 Depth-of-thought distribution for investors
playing healthy trustees non-anonymously. Healthy trust-
ees meet their investor partner at the beginning of the game and
are paid in front of their partner at the end of the game. These
subjects are not known to one another at the start of the game and
are randomly assigned the role of trustee or investor. This depth-
of-thought distribution is not statistically different from the
distribution in figure S2 (Fisher’s exact test p = 0.032).
(TIF)
Table S1 Did a small number of subjects drive
differences in the quintiles of inter-personal prediction
errors? The number of distinct subjects in low (bottom two
quintiles only) and high (upper too quintiles only) 1st and 2nd order
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prediction errors, the total subjects in each category, and the
percentage. Extremely few subjects were presented in the low or
high categories only. The majority of investors made contributions
to all the quintiles for both the 1st and 2nd order interpersonal
errors, regardless of their depth-of-thought levels.
(TIF)
Table S2 Parameters for reinforcement learning mod-
els. Estimated parameters k and b for different learning rates e for
reinforcement learning model.
(TIF)
Table S3 Model fit comparison. Comparison of average
negative log-likelihoods for reinforcement learning models using the
estimated parameters, and the computational theory of mind model.
(TIF)
Table S4 Joint classification table. Joint Investor/Trustee
depth-of-thought classification frequency table. Chi-Square test
gives p = 6.4e-05.
(TIF)
Text S1 Supplementary model information.
(DOC)
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